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CHAPTER 2 
The Lag Structure of Investment and Productivity Growth 
Thomas Grebel, TU Ilmenau, Germany 
Lionel Nesta, OFCE, University Nice Sophia-Antipolis, France 
2.1 Introduction 
“Growth is up”, as the European Commission acknowledges (European Commission, 
2017). Countries invest in their productivity. The European member countries have 
seemed to gradually overcome the burden of the financial crisis. However, the link 
between the type of investment and TFP growth is unclear. To shed light on this 
relationship, we investigate the following topics in this chapter: 
 The time lag characterising the impact of investment (tangible, intangible, and 
ICT) on TFP. 
 The total contribution of each type of investment to TFP in the long term. 
Assuming a non-linear Poisson-lag structure model, we calculate lag structures for 
three types of investment and identify the following time-lag structures: tangible 
assets, approximately 8 to 9 years; intangible assets, approximately 12 years; and 
ICT, approximately 14 years. The investment lag for investments in tangibles appears 
robust for all the models we performed. For investments in intangibles and ICT, 
significant results can be detected only for the most innovative countries. France, mid-
ranked in terms of innovativeness, according to the European Scoreboard (ESB), 
delivers no further evidence for shorter lag structures. There is no indication either for 
a higher impact of investment on TFP or for shorter investment lag structures. The 
results suggest that France invests excessively in intangibles. This finding challenges 
France’s high public support of investments in intangibles. 
2.2 Investment and Productivity Growth 
To date, Germany takes the lead in productivity growth. For this reason, we use it as a 
benchmark. Figure 2.1 illustrates the performance of various countries with respect to 
their productivity and investment growth relative to Germany as the benchmark. 
In all six panels of Figure 2.1, the solid line represents countries’ total factor 
productivity (TFP in the following, with 2000=100) relative to Germany’s TFP 
(2000=100); the dashed line indicates countries’ total investment (2000=100) relative 
to Germany’s total investment (2000=100). Whereas Austria and the Netherlands 
closely follow Germany’s TFP pattern, France, compared to Germany, has been facing 
a fall in relative TFP growth since the mid-2000s. This is puzzling when examining the 
relative investment index (dashed line) between France and Germany. France 
persistently made relatively higher investment efforts than Germany. Austria and the 
Netherlands, shown in the middle panel of the upper row in Figure 2.1, follow a 
pattern of TFP growth similar to that of Germany. Their relative increase in investment 
has also been slightly higher than that of Germany. The Netherlands reduced its 
investment sharply after the financial crisis while catching up in recent years. France, 
yet the third-largest economy in the EU, seems to have difficulties translating its 
investments into productivity gains, although its relative investment efforts were up to 
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20% higher than Germany’s.11 The three remaining countries, as depicted in this 
figure, show a similar evolution. The gradient of investment growth relative to 
Germany is higher for Spain, Italy, and Denmark; their productivity growth gradient, 
however, is lower. In Italy, investments apparently started to plummet after the 
financial crisis. 
Figure 2.1: Countries’ relative TFP (solid line) and relative total investment (dashed 
line)12 
 
Not all countries invest in the same way, and not all manage to translate their 
investments in the same way into productivity (Castellani et al., 2016; Bacchiocchi 
and Montobbio, 2010). One possible explanation is the so-called structural 
composition. With regard to the composition of France’s economy, as pointed out in 
Section 2.1, the manufacturing sector represents approximately 11% of GDP 
compared to that of Germany, with a share of 22.6%. As the manufacturing sector is 
more R&D intensive than the service sector, it is a matter of consequence that 
Germany should be investing more in R&D than France. A more challenging 
explanation, which we try to detect here, is the possible lack of capacity to translate 
investment into productivity (Ortega-Argilés et al. 2014). 
The objective of this section is to investigate the differences in investment effects 
among European countries. With the econometric specification that we use, possible 
                                                 
11 The term relative investment efforts takes the “fixed effects” of countries into account. This means that, for 
example, starting from a lower level of total investment in absolute terms, France increased its 
investment more intensively than Germany. Nevertheless, Germany, in absolute terms, spends more in 
investment than France. 
12 The solid line is the ratio between the TFP of the respective country and the German TFP. The TFP 
measure stems from the EU KLEMS data. It is an index (2000=100); thus, the ratio starts with 1 in 2000. 
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lag structures can be identified to reveal how much time it takes for investment to 
achieve its full effect. The duration between the time of investment and the resulting 
impact on productivity is unclear.13 Some investments, such as investments in 
infrastructure to speed up transportation time, may have an immediate effect on 
productivity. The effect of other investment decisions will be less immediate and may 
not come to the fore in productivity statistics for years; the investment in R&D is one 
example. 
To address this research question, we must ensure that the following requirements are 
met: (a) the data to be used must contain information on different types of 
investments, (b) the time span of the data must be sufficiently large to allow for a 
delayed effectiveness of investments as well as for a decay – in case the investment 
becomes obsolete over the course of time, and (c) the econometric specification must 
allow us to capture these mechanisms. 
The database from the EU KLEMS project meets these requirements and is presented 
in sub-section B. The empirical procedure, i.e., the distributed lag model, that we use 
to document the translational dynamics of investment into productivity (sub-section 
C), will allow us to model the cumulative effect of investment on productivity growth. 
The results are documented in sub-section D, in which we distinguish between the 
investment lag observed in investments in total assets and the different lags when 
decomposing investment into investments in tangible, ICT, and intangible assets. 
As the results show, an investment lag can be identified, not only for total investment 
but also for sub-types of investment, that is, tangible, intangible, and ICT 
investments. The expected time of tangible investment’s maximum effect is 
approximately 7 years. With respect to intangible and ICT investments, we could 
identify plausible investment lags only for the group of highly innovative countries. For 
these, the average time of maximum investment effectiveness is approximately 12 
years for intangible investments and 14 years for ICT investment. Conversely, we 
could not find empirical evidence for decomposed investment types in the group of 
less innovative countries. Including France in the group of high-performing countries, 
an increase in the average investment lag, though not significant, could be detected. 
The results give some indication in favour of the hypothesis that France is possibly 
less successful in translating investment into productivity than the more innovative 
countries in Europe. 
2.3 EU KLEMS Data 
The data that we use stem from the Groningen project EU KLEMS (van Ark and Jäger, 
2017). It offers the possibility of distinguishing ten different types of investments on 
the country level. It covers 12 countries of the European Union: Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The types of investment classes they offer are 
computing equipment, communications equipment, computer software and databases, 
transport equipment, other machinery and equipment, total non-residential 
investment, residential structures, cultivated assets, research and development, and 
other assets. We converted all variables into euros using OECD conversion rates. 
To end up with the highest number of observations possible, we used the most fine-
grained industry classification that the EU KLEMS data provide. The following 
                                                 
13 Since France seems to invest significantly in ICT, we decided to specifically emphasise this type of 
investment. Therefore, we built three categories: tangible, intangible, and ICT. 
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industries were selected: food products, beverages and tobacco (10-12); textiles, 
wearing apparel, leather and related products (13-15); wood and paper products; 
printing and reproduction of recorded media (16-18); coke and refined petroleum 
products (19); chemicals and chemical products (20-21); rubber and plastics 
products, and other non-metallic mineral products (22-23); basic metals and 
fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment (24-25); electrical and 
optical equipment (26-27); machinery and equipment n.e.c. (28); transport 
equipment (29-30); other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and 
equipment (31-33); wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles (45); wholesale trade, except for motor vehicles and motorcycles (46); 
retail trade, except for motor vehicles and motorcycles (47); transport and storage 
(49-52); postal and courier activities (53); publishing, audio-visual and broadcasting 
activities (58-60); telecommunications (61); IT and other information services (62-
63); and professional, scientific, technical, administrative and support service 
activities (70-79). 
The variables we employ in our production function estimation approach, presented in 
the next sub-section, concern the variables from the EU KLEMS project reported in 
Table 2.1
 
Table 2.1: Description of variables taken from the EU KLEMS database. 
Variable Description EU KLEMS Label 
𝑌 Gross output, volume (2010 prices) GO_QI 
M Intermediate inputs, volume (2010 prices) II_QI 
L Total hours worked by persons engaged 
(thousands) 
H_EMP 
   
𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡 All assets* Iq_GFCF 
   
𝐼𝐼𝐶𝑇 Computing equipment* Iq_IT 
Communications equipment* Iq_CT 
   
𝐼𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁 
Computer software and databases* Iq_Soft_DB 
Research and development* Iq_RD 
Other IPP assets* Iq_OIPP 
   
𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑁 𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁  
𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑁_𝑊𝑂_𝐼𝐶𝑇 𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁 − 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝑇  
VA Gross value added, volume (2010 prices) VA_QI 
* Real gross fixed capital formation volume (2010 prices) 
Variable Description EU KLEMS Label 
𝑌 Gross output, volume (2010 prices) GO_QI 
M Intermediate inputs, volume (2010 prices) II_QI 
L Total hours worked by persons engaged 
(thousands) 
H_EMP 
   
𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡 All assets* Iq_GFCF 
   
𝐼𝐼𝐶𝑇 Computing equipment* Iq_IT 
Communications equipment* Iq_CT 
   
𝐼𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁 
Computer software and databases* Iq_Soft_DB 
Research and development* Iq_RD 
Other IPP assets* Iq_OIPP 
   
𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑁 𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁  
𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑁_𝑊𝑂_𝐼𝐶𝑇 𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁 − 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝑇  
VA Gross value added, volume (2010 prices) VA_QI 
* Real gross fixed capital formation volume (2010 prices) 
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In Table 2.2, we present summary statistics. When the most fine-grained 
disaggregation possible was chosen, more than 11 thousand observations could be 
retrieved. 
Table 2.2: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
ln(Y) 11,659 10.279 2.049 2.822 17.099 
ln(L) 11,698 12.246 2.509 1.579 19.446 
ln(M) 11,472 9.656 1.984 2.512 16.319 
ln(𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡) 11,679 7.397 2.764 0.000 14.948 
ln(𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑁) 11,469 7.099 2.743 0.000 14.721 
ln(𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁) 11,469 5.562 2.824 0.000 13.567 
ln(𝐼𝐼𝐶𝑇) 11,469 4.221 2.409 0.000 12.108 
ln(𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑁_𝑊𝑂_𝐼𝐶𝑇) 11,469 6.982 2.771 0.000 14.666 
ln(VA) 11,730 9.482 2.124 -0.132 16.488 
 
To provide an overview of the total investment of countries, the investment intensity 
of countries is reported in Table 2.3. The investment share in value added is calculated 
using the industry aggregation type of EU-KLEMS labelled “MARKT”.14 On average, 
22% of value added (VA) accounts for total investment (𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡), ICT investment (𝐼𝐼𝐶𝑇) of 
approximately 1%, investment in tangible assets (𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑁) of 17%, and investment in 
intangible assets (𝐼𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁) of 5%. France’s total investment share of 20% ranges in the 
middle, as does investment in ICT with a share of 1%. The investment of France in 
intangible and tangible assets amounts to 7% and 13%, respectively. 
Table 2.3: Investment share in percent of value added (EU KLEMS type of 
aggregation: “MARKT”). 
In %VA 𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝑇 𝐼𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁 𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑁 𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑁_𝑊𝑂_𝐼𝐶𝑇 
Austria 23 2 5 19 17 
Czech Republic 31 2 4 27 25 
Germany 19 1 4 14 13 
Denmark 22 1 6 16 15 
Spain 23 1 3 20 18 
Finland 20 1 7 13 12 
France 20 1 7 13 12 
Italy 21 1 3 17 16 
Luxembourg 17 1 2 16 15 
Netherlands 18 1 5 13 12 
Sweden 26 2 10 16 14 
Slovakia 26 2 2 24 23 
United Kingdom 17 1 5 12 12 
Mean 22 1 5 17 16 
 
                                                 
14 This means the exclusion of the following sectors: real estate activities (L); public administration and 
defence; compulsory social security (O); education (P); health and social work (Q); activities of 
households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of households for 
own use (T); and activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies (U). 
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Because the objective of this exercise is to detect differences not only in investment 
lags among types of investment but also between countries, we intended to perform 
regressions on each country. However, single-country regressions did not render any 
significant results, possibly due to the low number of observations. Therefore, we used 
groups of countries to produce plausible results. The criterion for grouping countries is 
the country ranking by the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS).15 As investment is 
key to a country’s innovativeness, and we thought it would be straightforward to 
group countries according to their innovativeness. The most innovative countries 
(HIGH_SB) according to the European Innovation Scoreboard are Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The group of 
low-performing countries (LOW_SB) in our sample consists of the Czech Republic, 
Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, and Slovakia. These two groups bracket France as a mid-
performing country in terms of innovativeness. 
2.4 Econometric Specification 
With respect to the econometric specification, we follow a production function 
estimation approach. The traditional Cobb-Douglas production function reads as 
follows: 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝛽𝐾𝐿𝛽𝐿𝑀𝛽𝑀 
Since capital stock (K) is a compound measure of past investment, the time dimension 
may be lost in the aggregation process. Therefore, we adapt the production function to 
the following form: 
𝑌 = 𝐴(∏ 𝑒𝜔𝑡−𝜏𝐼𝑡−𝜏
𝜏=𝑇
𝜏=1 )
𝛽𝐾𝐿𝛽𝐿𝑀𝛽𝑀  (1) 
Instead of capital (K) as a stock variable, we use investment attached to a distributed 
lag structure. This ensures that we capture the time dimension of productivity effects 
from investment. Letter A in equation 1 denotes total factor productivity; Y, total 
output; L, labour; and M, material. The parameters to be estimated, which are 
associated with labour, material and investment, are labelled 𝛽𝐿, 𝛽𝑀, and 𝛽𝐾, 
respectively. Parameter 𝜔 indicates the weights of the time-dependent investment 
type, lagged by 𝜏 years. The optimal number of lags 𝑇 must be determined in the 
regression procedure later. 
The advantage of a distributed-lag-structure model is that it circumvents the 
autoregression problem faced in aggregated time series by imposing a specific lag 
structure. The drawback is that which parametric structure appears plausible for the 
effectiveness of investment must be decided beforehand. The literature on distributed-
lag-structure models provides many conceivable specifications: Koyck (1954) 
proposes a structure with geometrically successively decreasing lags, Solow (1960) 
generalises Koyck’s idea with a Pascal distribution, Almon (1965) implements a 
polynomial structure, and Gambardella (1995) and others use a Poisson structure. 
Each of the lag structures makes strong assumptions about the dynamic process, 
which can lead to quite implausible results. A polynomial lag of more than two degrees 
often leads to negative coefficients. Although it might be conceivable that investment 
might have negative effects on productivity at times, on an aggregate level, it seems 
rather implausible. Using a Poisson lag structure, negative effects are excluded by 
definition. In other words, a Poisson lag structure imposes the assumption that 
investments always have a positive effect on productivity. As we perform our analysis 
                                                 
15 see http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/facts-figures/scoreboards_en 
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on an aggregate level, comparing productivity effects of investment across countries, 
we decided to make this strong assumption and use a Poisson lag structure. 
To implement this approach, we take the log of equation 1. Lowercase letters indicate 
logged values. Therefore, the extended production function distributed lag structure, 
including an error term 𝜀, reads as follows: 
𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝐿𝑙 + 𝛽𝑀𝑚 + ∑ 𝛽𝐾
𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜔𝜏 𝑖𝜏
𝑗 + 𝜀𝐿𝜏=1     (2) 
To impose a Poisson lag structure, we substitute 𝜔𝜏 for 𝑒
−𝜆𝜆𝜏/𝜏! and obtain equation 3 
with the typical Poisson weights: 
𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝐿𝑙 + 𝛽𝑀𝑚 + ∑ 𝛽𝐾
𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1 ∑
𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝜏
𝜏!
 𝑖𝜏
𝑗 + 𝜀𝐿𝜏=1    (3) 
The different types of investment are denoted 𝑖𝑗. The weights 𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝜏/𝜏! for the specific 
investment type j can be interpreted as the total resulting variation in output given 
one unit change in 𝑖𝑗. As the weights follow a Poisson distribution, a unit change may 
affect output immediately and decay over time, or it may initially increase and then 
decline after a given time. 
For implementation purposes, the following steps are taken: 
1. Subtract country-industry fixed effects, and add the overall mean of the logged 
variables. 
2. Instrument labour (L), as it is an endogenous variable 
(1st-step regression). 
3. Determine the optimal lag structure.  
(2nd-step regression). 
4. Retrieve the mean time lag (𝜆) and the impact coefficient (𝛽𝐾). 
5. Compare the 𝜆𝑠 according to the selected classification of the investment and 
country groups. 
This procedure was applied in all subsequent models. Note that lowercase letters 
indicate logged and demeaned variables. To instrument labour, we use a two-stage 
least-square approach: we regress the log of labour (l) on the log of material input 
(m), the log of capital stock (k), a full set of year dummies, and the contemporaneous 
and the first two lags of the differenced values of labour (l). We use the predicted 
values from the OLS regression as an instrument for labour in the successive 
estimation. Since the Poisson lag structure is non-linear, non-linear estimation 
techniques must be applied.16 To determine the optimal lag length, we use the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC). 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 The Lag Structure of Investment on Gross Output 
                                                 
16 We use STATA 15 to perform all regressions. We start with two lags and use the estimates as initial values 
for the regression model with three lags, etc. 
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For a general picture of the investment lag structure across countries, we start with 
countries’ total investment. The second-step non-linear regression model reads as 
follows: 
𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝐿 ∗ 𝑙 + 𝛽𝑀 ∗ 𝑚 + 𝛽𝐾
𝑡𝑜𝑡 ∑
𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝜏
𝜏!
𝑖𝜏
𝑡𝑜𝑡 + 𝐷 + 𝜀𝑇𝜏=1    (4) 
The constant is labelled a. We include the log of labour (l) with its associated 
parameter 𝛽𝐿 as well as the log of material (m) with parameter 𝛽𝑀. As pointed out 
above, instead of capital stock, we use investment, i.e., the log of total investment 
(𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑡) with a Poisson lag structure. The lag-specific weights, denoted 𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝜏/𝜏!, depend 
on parameter 𝜆, which reflects the mean number of years to pass until the maximum 
impact of investment takes effect. The optimal number of lags to use in the respective 
2nd step regression is represented by T, whereas D stands for a full set of year 
dummies. The dependent variable Y stands for gross output. 
Although not all of the regression runs are of interest, we report the regression results 
for a selected number of lags (see Table 2.4) to show the consistency of our 
regressions. When the regressions based on the AIC information criterion are 
compared, the lowest AIC value serves as the selection criterion for choosing the 
optimal lag length. The optimal number of lags to choose, in this case, appears to be 
10 lags, as the model with 10 lags shows the lowest AIC value. The estimate of 𝛽𝐿 
suggests that approximately 37% of the output can be explained by labour, 53% by 
material, and approximately 9% by investment. The parameter of interest, i.e., 𝜆, 
indicates approximately seven or eight years until an additional euro of investment 
unfolds its maximum impact on total output. 
The estimates of the remaining regressions show that the estimates of 𝛽𝐿 and 𝛽𝑀 are 
quite stable despite using different time lags for investment. Parameter 𝛽𝐾
𝑡𝑜𝑡, which 
stands for the impact of investment on output, remains stable up to eleven lags 
(model 8). When the number of lags is increased beyond 11 years, the estimates 
skyrocket and become insignificant. Therefore, the AIC of the respective models tell us 
to reject lags longer than 10 years. 
In Table 2.5, we repeat the same exercise with investments in tangible assets 𝑖𝑇𝐴𝑁. 
Recall that this variable does not contain investment in computer software, databases, 
research and development or investment in other IPP assets. The specification of the 
regression equation is as follows: 
𝑌 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽𝐿 ∗ 𝑙 + 𝛽𝑀 ∗ 𝑚 + 𝛽𝐾
𝑇𝐴𝑁 ∑
𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝑇𝐴𝑁
𝜏
𝜏!
𝑖𝜏
𝑇𝐴𝑁 + 𝐷 + 𝜀𝑇𝜏=1    (5) 
The selection of regression models with different lags, shown in this table, delivers a 
very similar picture. A lag of ten to eleven years provides the best estimation results. 
Compared to Table 2.4, the estimates of 𝜆𝑇𝐴𝑁 are slightly lower, reporting less than 
seven years. Note that when higher lags are used in this setting, the estimates of all 
coefficients remain stable. This finding suggests that the turbulence observed in the 
coefficient estimates with higher lag orders in Table 2.4 must be related to the 
investments in intangible assets. 
 
  
Table 2.4: Lag structure of total investment and its impact on total output 
Dependent Variable: ln(y) 
VARIABLES 2 lags 5 lags 6 lags 7 lags 8 lags 9 lags 10 lags 11 lags 12 lags 13 lags 14 lags 15 lags 
             
𝛽𝐿 0.305*** 0.297*** 0.299*** 0.308*** 0.328*** 0.359*** 0.373*** 0.373*** 0.377*** 0.405*** 0.421*** 0.410*** 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
𝛽𝑀 0.570*** 0.561*** 0.559*** 0.554*** 0.545*** 0.533*** 0.528*** 0.528*** 0.537*** 0.539*** 0.541*** 0.550*** 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
𝛽𝐾
𝑡𝑜𝑡 0.069*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.078*** 0.086*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.114*** 1.717 2.906 4283972.7 
 
(0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.027) (4.135) (10.985) (0.000) 
𝜆𝑡𝑜𝑡 1.600** 2.858*** 3.077*** 3.650*** 4.771*** 6.724*** 7.765*** 7.765*** 10.355*** 18.505*** 19.945*** 41.533*** 
 
(0.680) (0.368) (0.345) (0.362) (0.422) (0.539) (0.571) (0.571) (1.092) (4.918) (7.243) (0.318) 
a 0.744*** 0.744*** 0.721*** 0.647*** 0.490** 0.242 0.111 0.111 0.092 -0.104 -0.238 -0.120 
 (0.199) (0.196) (0.195) (0.194) (0.192) (0.189) (0.188) (0.188) (0.201) (0.219) (0.223) (0.217) 
             
Observations 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,587 2,342 2,097 1,852 
R2 0.814 0.816 0.817 0.817 0.817 0.818 0.819 0.819 0.805 0.803 0.810 0.813 
Min. year 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
AIC -7978,68 -8010,84 -8014,97 -8020,21 -8025,65 -8035,1 -8045,88 -8045,88 -7618,9 -7212,15 -6737,69 -6286,26 
RMSE 0.0588 0.0585 0.0585 0.0584 0.0583 0.0582 0.0581 0.0581 0.0552 0.0515 0.0481 0.0439 
Adj. R2 0.813 0.815 0.815 0.816 0.816 0.817 0.817 0.817 0.804 0.802 0.809 0.812 
Numb. iterations 3 10 11 20 44 31 22 5 32 361 19 265 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
  
Table 2.5 Lag structure of investment in tangible assets (TAN) and the impact on output (y) 
Dependent Variable: ln(y) 
VARIABLES 2 lags 5 lags 6 lags 7 lags 8 lags 9 lags 10 lags 11 lags 12 lags 13 lags 14 lags 15 lags 
             𝛽𝐿 0.249*** 0.237*** 0.235*** 0.237*** 0.238*** 0.238*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.234*** 0.247*** 0.287*** 0.319*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) 
𝛽𝑀 0.611*** 0.611*** 0.613*** 0.613*** 0.612*** 0.611*** 0.611*** 0.611*** 0.614*** 0.609*** 0.594*** 0.584*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) 
𝛽𝐾
𝑇𝐴𝑁 0.027*** 0.041*** 0.048*** 0.064*** 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.017) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) 
𝜆𝑇𝐴𝑁 1.085 4.447*** 5.555*** 7.316*** 7.054*** 6.875*** 6.970*** 6.970*** 6.989*** 7.069*** 7.449*** 8.254*** 
 (0.849) (0.868) (0.920) (1.054) (0.798) (0.643) (0.569) (0.569) (0.612) (0.647) (0.756) (0.944) 
a 1.215*** 1.262*** 1.252*** 1.204*** 1.186*** 1.179*** 1.165*** 1.165*** 1.215*** 1.112*** 0.787*** 0.533** 
 (0.203) (0.200) (0.198) (0.195) (0.195) (0.194) (0.193) (0.193) (0.208) (0.231) (0.240) (0.240) 
             
Observations 2,732 2,732 2,732 2,732 2,732 2,732 2,732 2,732 2,487 2,242 1,997 1,752 
R2 0.817 0.818 0.819 0.820 0.821 0.821 0.822 0.822 0.812 0.810 0.810 0.814 
Min. year 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
AIC -7982,96 -8003,2 -8013,3 -8031,42 -8041,69 -8048,08 -8054,2 -8054,2 -7556,59 -7104,53 -6514,97 -5972,75 
RMSE 0.0558 0.0556 0.0555 0.0553 0.0552 0.0552 0.0551 0.0551 0.0526 0.0493 0.0470 0.0436 
Adj. R2 0.816 0.817 0.818 0.819 0.820 0.820 0.821 0.821 0.811 0.809 0.809 0.812 
Numb. iterations 6 15 12 13 8 7 8 2 7 6 7 8 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
Figure 2.2 illustrates the results of a 10-year lag structure found in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. 
The solid line describes the lag structure of total investment. The dashed line depicts 
tangible assets, subtracting intangible investments, investment in computer software, 
databases, research and development, and investment in other IPP assets from total 
investment. Compared to investment in total assets, the dynamics of the effectiveness 
of tangible investments are slightly lower. 
Figure 2.2:  Poisson lag structure with 𝝀𝒕𝒐𝒕 = 𝟕. 𝟕𝟕 (solid line) and 𝝀𝑻𝑨𝑵 = 𝟔. 𝟗𝟕 (dashed 
line) 
 
 
2.5.2 The Lag Structure of Types of Investment on Gross Output 
The decomposition of investment allows us to shed some light on the time lags of 
specific investments and their effect on output. To carve out certain types of 
investment, we decided to use the following classification: investment in tangible assets 
without tangible investment in ICT (𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑁_𝑊𝑂_𝐼𝐶𝑇), investment in intangible assets (𝐼𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁), 
and investment in ICT (𝐼𝐼𝐶𝑇). In principle, the estimation procedure is the same as 
above. After instrumenting labour in the first step, the second-stage non-linear 
regression equation is as follows: 
𝑌 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽𝐿 ∗ 𝑙 + 𝛽𝑀 ∗ 𝑚 + ∑ 𝛽𝐾
𝑖 ∑
𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝑖
𝜏
𝜏!
𝑖𝜏
𝑧𝑇
𝜏=1
3
𝑧=1 + 𝐷 + 𝜀  (6) 
for 𝑧 = {𝑇𝐴𝑁_𝑊𝑂_𝐼𝐶𝑇, 𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁, ICT}. The results are gathered in Table 2.6, which 
summarises three groups of regressions. Each group contains the second-stage 
regression with two different lag lengths. Models 1 and 2, for example, are based on the 
same regression equation but with different time lags. Regression 1 assumes a lag of 10 
years and regression 2 a lag length of 15 years.17 According to the AIC, model 2 is the 
preferred model. The average time until the main effect of ICT investment unfolds is 
almost 17 years. The choice of the lag length also holds for models 4 to 6; the preferred 
lag length is 15 years. In model 4, 𝜆𝐼𝐶𝑇 is approximately 17 years. When including all 
three types of investment in a single regression, as in model 6, 𝜆𝐼𝐶𝑇 and 𝜆𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁 increase 
even more, 𝜆𝐼𝐶𝑇 to approximately 20 years and 𝜆𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁 to approximately 22 years, in 
contrast to 𝜆𝑇𝐴𝑁_𝑊𝑂_𝐼𝐶𝑇, which remains stable at approximately 7 years. The problem, 
however, is that the impacts of the investment in intangible assets 𝛽𝐾
𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁 and of ICT 
investment 𝛽𝐾
𝐼𝐶𝑇 are insignificant. Hence, a direct impact on output growth cannot be 
                                                 
17 We performed several regressions with different lag lengths and chose the lag lengths with the lowest AIC. 
60 
corroborated. Only parameters 𝛽𝐾
𝑇𝐴𝑁_𝑊𝑂_𝐼𝐶𝑇and 𝜆𝑇𝐴𝑁_𝑊𝑂_𝐼𝐶𝑇 remain robust, with 
approximately 0.05 and 7, respectively. 
Table 2.6: Investment decomposition: tangibles, intangibles, and ICT. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 10 lags 15 lags 10 lags 15 lags 10 lags 15 lags 
       𝛽𝐿 0.324*** 0.338*** 0.303*** 0.332*** 0.294*** 0.345*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) 
𝛽𝑀 0.597*** 0.576*** 0.592*** 0.564*** 0.611*** 0.566*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
𝛽𝐾
𝑇𝐴𝑁_𝑊𝑂_𝐼𝐶𝑇 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.033*** 0.040*** 0.035*** 0.042*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
𝜆𝑇𝐴𝑁_𝑊𝑂_𝐼𝐶𝑇 8.642*** 7.714*** 7.104*** 6.920*** 7.145*** 7.089*** 
 (1.052) (0.459) (0.961) (0.551) (0.880) (0.493) 
𝛽𝐾
𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁 539.1*103 0.090* 
  
2.3*106 0.174 
 (2.2*106) (0.054) (0.000) (0.767) 
𝜆𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁 39.207 16.88*** 
  
41.355*** 21.880* 
 (55.643) (2.773) (0.475) (12.207) 
𝛽𝐾
𝐼𝐶𝑇 
  
0.104 0.101** 191.805 0.287 
 (0.097) (0.043) (2,290.826) (0.221) 
𝜆𝐼𝐶𝑇 
  
13.18*** 17.09*** 27.941 20.36 *** 
 (2.837) (1.895) (18.306) (2.417) 
a 0.273 0.136 0.627*** 0.493** 0.495** 0.192 
 (0.233) (0.231) (0.243) (0.239) (0.231) (0.225) 
       Observations 1,741 1,741 1,752 1,752 1,741 1,741 
R2 0.837 0.841 0.815 0.820 0.838 0.848 
Min. year 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 
AIC -6163,91 -6202,5 -5980,56 -6026,86 -6169,67 -6280,4 
RMSE 0.0408 0.0403 0.0434 0.0429 0.0407 0.0394 
Adj. R2 0.836 0.839 0.813 0.818 0.836 0.846 
Numb. iterations 3321 40 26 46 1237 76 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Next, we will investigate whether there is a difference in investment effects between the 
most innovative and the least innovative countries. A specific focus will be placed on 
France. As regressions for individual countries do not converge in most cases because of 
insufficient information, we decided to perform all regressions with and without France 
to test whether France makes a difference. With respect to the ranking of countries, the 
European Innovation Scoreboard is employed to obtain country rankings according to 
their innovative performance. As pointed out above, the high-performing countries 
contained in the EU KLEMS dataset are Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom(, and France) (HIGH_SB), and the lower-
performing group (LOW_SB) is the Czech Republic, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, Slovakia(, 
and France). 
 
   
Table 2.7: Investment lags of highly innovative countries. 
 
(7) (7fr) (8) (8fr) (9) (9fr) 
VARIABLES without FR with FR without FR with FR without FR with FR 
  
      𝛽𝐿 0.370*** 0.340*** 0.354*** 0.340*** 0.386*** 0.347*** 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.045) (0.041) (0.043) (0.039) 
𝛽𝑀 0.487*** 0.528*** 0.498*** 0.531*** 0.482*** 0.527*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.029) (0.026) (0.028) (0.024) 
𝛽𝐾
𝑡𝑜𝑡 0.155*** 0.169*** 
     (0.020) (0.033) 
𝜆𝑡𝑜𝑡 8.989*** 10.074*** 
     (0.713) (0.925) 
𝛽𝐾
𝑇𝐴𝑁 
  
0.104*** 0.094*** 0.106*** 0.097*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
𝜆𝑇𝐴𝑁 
  
8.644*** 8.655*** 8.545*** 8.561*** 
 (0.469) (0.485) (0.455) (0.475) 
𝛽𝐾
𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁 
    
0.048*** 0.044*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) 
𝜆𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁 
    
11.713*** 12.741*** 
 (2.256) (2.799) 
𝛽𝐾
𝐼𝐶𝑇 
  
0.128*** 0.124*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) 
𝜆𝐼𝐶𝑇 
  
13.839*** 14.278*** 14.311*** 14.895*** 
 (0.672) (0.754) (0.888) (1.037) 
a 0.361 0.395* 0.350 0.270 -0.114 -0.033 
 (0.234) (0.224) (0.299) (0.288) (0.302) (0.285) 
       
Observations 1,609 1,849 949 1,114 949 1,114 
R2 0.784 0.798 0.797 0.812 0.803 0.815 
Min. year 2000 2000 2005 2005 2005 2005 
AIC -4804.58 -5615.04 -3375.04 -4043.08 -3396.4 -4055.23 
RMSE 0.0539 0.0526 0.0401 0.0388 0.0396 0.0385 
Adj. R2 0.781 0.796 0.794 0.810 0.799 0.812 
Numb. iterations 9 10 13 15 17 16 
 
Table 2.7 reports the results when performing the above regressions on the sub-sample 
of the best-performing group of countries (HIGH_SB). Model 7 uses regression equation 
(4) and thus takes into account the investment in total assets of HIGH_SB countries 
when calculating the underlying lag structure. The optimal number of lags in this model 
is 10 years. The corresponding results indicate 𝜆𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 8.99. Hence, the maximum effect 
of an additional euro, invested in HIGH_SB countries, can be expected after 
approximately 9 years. Adding France to this group renders column 7fr. As a result, 𝜆𝑡𝑜𝑡 
slightly increases to 10.1 years. In other words, the average investment effects slow 
down by one year. Unfortunately, there is no statistical evidence that this change is 
significant. A further decomposition of tangible investments into tangible investments 
without ICT (𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑁_𝑊𝑂_𝐼𝐶𝑇) and investment in ICT (𝐼𝐼𝐶𝑇) discloses a significant gap in the 
time lapse of effectiveness between the two investment types. 
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Table 2.8: Explicit and accumulated lag weights (specification model (9)) 
lag weight TAN weight INTAN weight ICT weight TAN weight INTAN weight ICT 
 a) explicit weights b) accumulated weights 
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
4 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
5 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00 
6 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.02 0.00 
7 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.25 0.05 0.01 
8 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.38 0.10 0.03 
9 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.52 0.17 0.05 
10 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.65 0.27 0.10 
11 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.76 0.38 0.16 
12 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.84 0.49 0.23 
13 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.91 0.61 0.33 
14 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.95 0.71 0.43 
15 0.02 0.09 0.11 0.97 0.80 0.54 
16 0.01 0.07 0.10 0.99 0.86 0.64 
17 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.99 0.91 0.73 
18 0.00 0.03 0.08 1.00 0.95 0.80 
19 0.00 0.02 0.06 1.00 0.97 0.86 
20 0.00 0.01 0.05 1.00 0.98 0.91 
21 0.00 0.01 0.03 1.00 0.99 0.94 
22 0.00 0.00 0.02 1.00 1.00 0.96 
23 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.00 1.00 0.98 
24 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.00 1.00 0.99 
25 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.00 1.00 0.99 
26 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Model 8, not counting France among the group of high performers, shows that the 
expected time span until the maximum effectiveness of tangible investments is 
approximately 9 years, in contrast to investments in ICT, which take approximately five 
years longer.18 Adding France to this group of countries increases 𝜆𝐼𝐶𝑇 again – though 
not to a significant extent. Model 9 disaggregates investment types into three 
categories (𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑁_𝑊𝑂_𝐼𝐶𝑇 , 𝐼𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁 , and 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝑇). With all three types of investments included 
(model 10), investment in tangible assets has its largest effect after approximately 12 
years, and ICT investments take approximately 14 years. When France is added, the 
time spans for intangibles as well as ICT investment slightly increase – but also not to a 
significant extent. The difference between Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 is that we leave out 
the less innovative countries. The exclusion renders the coefficients 𝛽𝐾
𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁 and 
𝛽𝐾
𝐼𝐶𝑇 significant; hence, the group of high-performing countries provides evidence that 
investments in all three types of assets translate into productivity growth. Conducting 
the same exercise for the low-performing group of countries delivers neither plausible 
nor significant results. For this reason, we did not report those estimations. 
For high performers, the evidence supports the intuition that investments increase 
productivity. The magnitude of the coefficients also indicates that there are different 
degrees of effectiveness. When France is counted among the group of highly innovative 
countries (model 9fr), 𝛽𝐾
𝑇𝐴𝑁_𝑊𝑂_𝐼𝐶𝑇is approximately 0.1, 𝛽𝐾
𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑁 is 0.04, and 𝛽𝐾
𝐼𝐶𝑇 is 0.11. 
                                                 
18 In models 7 and 7fr, we use 10 lags, and in models 8, 8fr, 9, and 9fr, we use a lag of 15 years to estimate the 
lag structure of investment types. The lag length was decided based on the the AIC. 
   
Suppose that investment increases by 10%; output will eventually increase by 1%, 
0.4%, and 1.1% due to investment in tangibles, intangibles, and ICT, respectively. To 
illustrate the dynamics, Table 2.8 reports the corresponding lag-specific weights. The 
column “weight TAN” reflects the lag weights for tangible investment. We observe the 
highest lag weights for the lag of nine years with weight = 0.14; for intangibles, it is 12 
years (weight INTAN = 0.12), and for ICT, it is 15 years (weight ICT =0.11). 
Accumulating each column of the explicit weights leads to the last three columns of that 
table. For tangible investments, 52% of the total effect is reached after 9 years, and 
after 18 years, the growth effect fades out; i.e., the accumulated weight reaches 1. For 
intangibles, 50% of the total effect is reached after 12 years with a fade-out of 22 
years, and for ICT, the half-time is less than 15 years with a fade-out of 26 years. 
Whereas these weights indicate only the shares in the total effect of investment that 
sums up to one, they do not describe the actual growth effect. For this, the weights 
must be multiplied by their respective 𝛽-coefficients. The latter scale the timely effect of 
investment. Figure 2.3 illustrates the relationship between weights and impact 
parameters 𝛽. 
Panel a) illustrates the explicit weights, as reported in Table 2.8 (columns a). Panel b) 
depicts the last three columns, which are the accumulated counterparts (columns b). 
Multiplying the 𝛽-coefficients by their explicit weights rescales the weight distribution. 
The outcome is the actual effect of investment on output. This reduces the weights to 
10% for tangible investments (grey line in panel a), to 4% for intangibles and to 11% 
for ICT. Panel c) illustrates the evolution of the actual impact of investment on 
productivity. 
As the four panels point out, investments in tangibles have the most immediate effect 
on productivity growth, followed by investments in intangible assets and ICT 
investments. As far as the accumulated long-term effect of investment is concerned 
(panel d), the results suggest that the long-term effect of ICT investments is highest 
compared to investments in tangibles and intangibles. The effect of ICT investments is 
twice as high as that of investments in intangible assets. It is even slightly higher than 
the long-term effect of investments in tangibles. 
These results support the findings of Thum-Thysen et al. (2017) and the work by 
Corrado et al. (2012, 2013). Thum-Thysen et al. (2017) underline the role of 
investments in intangible assets. As we use a Poisson lag structure estimation technique 
instead of a heterogeneous dynamic panel regression model (pooled mean group (PMG) 
estimation),19 we obtain time lags for each type of investment. The discrepancy 
between their and our findings is that the effect of investments in intangibles is not 
three times as much as the effect of investment in tangibles. This is due to 
distinguishing three types of assets with ICT as a third category. 
                                                 
19 The pooled mean group (PMG) estimation, which they use, is an error correction model that yields an average 
time span of investment effects on productivity growth. The Poisson lag structure allows us to distinguish 
different time spans between different kinds of investment in a single model. 
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Figure 2.3: Lag weights (a), accumulated lag weights (b), effective lag weights (c), and 
accumulated effective lag weights (d) 
 
 
2.5.3. Scenarios 
The results show that the type of investment is decisive in boosting output. The 
investment in tangible assets takes the largest share in total investment, whereas the 
impact on output is largest for ICT investments (𝛽𝐾𝐼𝐶𝑇 = 11%), according to our model 
(9fr). Among the three types of investment, the investments in intangibles have the 
lowest impact, with 𝛽𝐾𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁 = 4%. Hence, the effect of one euro invested in ICT in total is 
almost three times as high as in the case of intangibles. 
   
Given the robustness of the results, the investment strategy followed by France can be 
put into perspective. For one euro value added, France (Germany) invests 0.8% (1.0%) 
in ICT, 12.9% (5.4%) in intangibles and 10% (14.0%) in tangibles. To understand the 
extent to which this investment strategy matters in terms of output, we develop several 
scenarios. Using Germany as a benchmark, we calculate counterfactuals for France: What 
effect would a different investment strategy have on French output? The scenarios that 
we consider are summarised in Table 2.9. 
Table 2.9: Scenarios for France using different investment strategies 
  Structure of investment 
  France Germany 
Level of 
Investment  
France Scenario S0 Scenario S2 
Germany Scenario S1 Scenario S3 
 
The scenarios include the following counterfactual items: 
S0: Keep actual investment situation in France (base scenario) 
S1: Adjust the French total investment per value added ratio to the German ratio 
S2: Keep the French investment structure and impose the German investment 
level 
S3: Adjust both the structure and the level of France’s investment to the German 
structure and level of investment 
 
The base scenario (S0) is calculated according to equation (7): 
𝑆0 = 𝛽𝐾
𝑇𝐴𝑁 ∑
𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝑇𝐴𝑁
𝜏
𝜏!
𝑖𝜏
𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑇
𝜏=1 + 𝛽𝐾
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁 ∑
𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁
𝜏
𝜏!
𝑖𝜏
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑇
𝜏=1 + 𝛽𝐾
𝐼𝐶𝑇 ∑
𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐶𝑇
𝜏
𝜏!
𝑖𝜏
𝐼𝐶𝑇𝑇
𝜏=1  (7) 
For scenario S1, we rescale the investment variables 𝑖𝜏
𝑇𝐴𝑁 , 𝑖𝜏
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝜏
𝐼𝐶𝑇so that the sum of 
all three types of investment reaches the relative investment level per value added of 
Germany while keeping the share of investment types (investment structure) constant. 
In scenario S2, the amount of the total investment of France remains unchanged, but the 
structure is adjusted to the German case. Scenario 3 combines the two manipulations 
with a rescaling and a restructuring of French investments to match the German case. 
Having calculated all four scenarios, we compare scenarios S1, S2, and S3 with the base 
scenario, S0, by calculating the relative change in output yielded by each scenario. Table 
2.10 collects the results. Comparing scenario S0 with itself generates trivia, as it renders 
a change of 0%, whereas changing only the structure of French investments to the 
German structure (S1) produces a change of 3.5%. Hence, output would increase by 
3.5%. Adjusting the level of investments to Germany’s investment level is tantamount to 
reducing French investments in all three types by the same proportion (S2). In this 
scenario, the French output would decrease by 2.9%. Combining both in scenario S3, 
that is, reducing France’s investment level and adjusting its structure to that of Germany, 
would still induce an increase in output of 0.6%. 
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Table 2.10: Scenarios for France using different investment strategies 
 
  Structure of investment 
  France Germany 
Level of 
investment 
France 0.0% -2.9% 
Germany 3.5% 0.6% 
 
Despite the fact that our estimations are based on aggregate data, which possibly do not 
capture all the relevant information about countries’ output determinants, these results 
reveal that France does not necessarily have a general investment problem per se. It 
invests more per euro of value added than Germany does. Solely reducing investments 
would make the output situation worse, but changing the composition of investment 
could create a positive effect on output. According to the estimations, France could even 
reduce its investments without hurting output, provided that it restructured its 
composition of investments. 
Furthermore, France invests more than twice as much as Germany, measured in value 
added, in intangible assets. Considering the relatively low impact (𝛽𝐾
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁=4.4%) of 
intangibles on output, it seems that France invests excessively in intangibles. A euro 
invested in ICT or tangibles would have a much higher impact. Differences in the 
investment structure might be due to the differences in countries’ sectoral composition. 
Nonetheless, it is doubtful whether the incentive to invest in intangibles in France can be 
explained solely by market forces. Figure 2.12 in chapter 0 substantiates this conjecture 
even further. In contrast to Germany, France supports private R&D with substantial tax 
incentives, yet its innovative output is lower than that of Germany (Grebel, 2017). 
It must be emphasised that this study requires further research based on less 
aggregated data to provide a full understanding of the mechanism behind investment 
behaviour. What we may conclude from this study, however, is that France should 
reconsider its public R&D support. 
2.6 Summary, Discussion, and Caveats 
This chapter investigated the lag structure of investment. We applied a 2-stage non-
linear least square estimation technique to estimate the lag structure of different types of 
investment in selected European countries. To cope with endogeneity, we instrumented 
labour in a first-stage regression. We used its predictions as instruments, which were 
inserted in the 2nd-stage non-linear regression model. The basic regression equation 
resembles a standard Cobb-Douglas production function estimation procedure. Instead of 
using capital as the typical stock of capital, we substituted capital for an investment lag 
structure. In doing so, we capture the dynamic effects of investment on output growth. 
The data in this study stem from the EU KLEMS project. As these data are generated in a 
consistent way across a selection of European countries, they are predestined for this 
type of analysis. Furthermore, the EU KLEMS data offer a detailed classification of 
investment types, which we make use of in our study. 
The results show that different lag structures for different types of investment can be 
identified. Tangible investment, intangible investment and ICT investment require 
different time spans to take effect. On average, tangible investments can be expected to 
unfold their maximum effect on output after approximately 8 to 9 years. With respect to 
investments in intangibles and ICT, the lag structure is equivocal when all countries are 
   
taken into account. Decomposing the sample into two sub-samples of more and less 
innovative countries also delivers significant results for the investment lag structures of 
intangibles and ICT. Accordingly, the time span of the effect of investment in intangibles 
is approximately 12 years, and that for ICT is approximately 14 years. The analysis of 
the low-performing country group does not provide significant results either for the lag 
structure of investment in intangibles or for investments in ICT. The estimate that seems 
robust across all regressions is the estimated time lag of investments for tangibles. As far 
as Solow’s paradox is concerned, at least for more innovative countries, a significant 
though delayed impact of ICT investment on output can be detected. 
Among the countries in the dataset, France is mid-ranked in terms of innovativeness. 
Since the early 2000s, France has made considerable efforts to increase its investments, 
and it systematically invests more per value added than Germany. The downside of this 
development is that France has difficulty translating investments into productivity. 
Compared to Germany, which increased its TFP by 5% within the time period considered, 
France has not managed to increase its TFP. 
France is outstanding in its relative share of investment in intangibles. It invests more 
than twice as much in intangibles as Germany, notwithstanding the fact that this 
investment does not pay off: Setting aside the fact that the effectiveness of France’s 
investment is lower than that of Germany’s, the return on investment in intangibles is 
much lower than that for investments in tangibles and ICT, according to our study. 
Together with the generous tax incentives that France grants firms, our results clearly 
challenge this policy. France needs to reconsider its public R&D support. 
In future research, there are several caveats to be considered. For estimating lag 
structures, longer time series data should be employed. Instead of using aggregate data, 
which blur the underlying mechanisms, we suggest performing this exercise with firm-
level data. Firm-level data are available for most European countries. The challenge in 
this regard is to cope with the confidentiality restrictions of countries when trying to 
perform comparative studies. Finally, policy interventions should be taken into account as 
well. They tend to distort the link between private R&D investments and productivity 
growth. It would be interesting to determine whether France, when reducing its support 
for R&D investments, could eventually benefit from a higher efficiency of R&D 
investments.   
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